Edited By: William C. Hannas and Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Published By: Routledge
Reviewed By: Joseph Vann, per Concordiam contributor
“China’s Quest for Foreign Technology: Beyond Espionage” is an essential read for policymakers, security professionals and, most importantly, business leaders. It is a superb anthology that, although first published in 2021, is more relevant than ever. The book provides one of the most comprehensive collections of essays — all from renowned China experts — on Beijing’s acquisition of foreign technology and information.
China’s insatiable appetite for technology has long presented a dilemma to Western countries. As the Cold War ended, the West became inebriated with its successes and, for the most part, cast aside concerns about protecting prized technology. After China’s harsh putdown of the 1989 riots in Tiananmen Square, any contest with Beijing seemingly belonged to the Cold War. As the United States’ entry into the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War marked the beginning of its change in war-planning focus from great-power to regional conflicts, the rout of Iraqi forces by the U.S.-led coalition was a wake-up call to China. By most accounts, Beijing learned that it was ill-prepared technologically and doctrinally for any war with the U.S. From this realization, China embarked on a global crusade — using methods both legal and illegal — to acquire technology and information. These efforts succeeded well beyond expectations and show no indication of abatement.
Huey-Meei Chang and co-editor William C. Hannas open with a scene-setter that appropriately calibrates China’s reputation for innovation by dispelling myths about its ability to innovate. The authors describe China’s “composite innovation system” that relies on both foreign and indigenous approaches, with the former being the acquisition of innovative technology, and the latter being more practical in application. This approach has changed as China adapts, applies and improves that acquired technology. This well-researched chapter pulls together China’s determined efforts to have its citizens educated abroad for the purpose of acquiring technology and knowledge. One key takeaway: The past assessments that dismissed China’s quest for technology as purely copycat culture are mistaken because the Chinese can innovate with or without foreign models.
Chapter 2 unfolds with the bigger story. Andrew Spear’s contribution is the appropriately titled “Serve the Motherland While Working Overseas.” In it, he sets 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, as the starting line for China’s ongoing technology quest and prophetically points to Deng’s declaration: “Thousands, or even tens of thousands, should be sent abroad rather than a handful. … We should make every effort to speed it up and increasingly widen our path.” Roughly 2.21 million Overseas Chinese Scholars remain abroad today to generate large-scale technology transfers. Spear puts “brain drain” into a Chinese context of not worrying where the talent resides but how it can be utilized for China, and details various methods used to incentivize overseas Chinese to “serve the motherland.”
Jeffrey Stoff, in Chapter 3, focuses on China’s talent programs with an insight into how Beijing recruits foreign experts to work in China to facilitate technology transfer. China’s ability to observe and to learn is typically underappreciated. Stoff cites the U.S.-trained Chinese physicist Qian Xuesen, who worked on the Manhattan Project and returned home to become the most prominent figure in Beijing’s nuclear programs. Delving deeper, Stoff outlines how the current talent program is a newer version of the 1994 Hundred Talents Plan. The Chinese state and the Communist Party of China (CCP) have succeeded it with a flagship program called the Recruitment Program for Global Experts, commonly known as the Thousand Talents Plan. These are just a few of hundreds of China’s programs — all configured to increase access to intellectual capital from around the world.
In Chapter 4, Karen M. Sutter describes how China approaches technology transfer through commerce. She points to the role of trade and investment in China’s highly developed practices for obtaining foreign technology, and also illuminates a government plan that forces technology transfer as a requirement for doing business in China. As Sutter states, China seeks access to ventures that include aerospace, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, data analytics, materials and semiconductors. The key takeaway: There can be no misconception about the size and efficiency of China’s strategy to acquire foreign technology — and its successes.
In Chapter 5, Anna B. Puglisi wonderfully brings into perspective the difference between Western and Chinese views on technology. The concept that technology can only be developed in a democracy and that Western countries, especially the U.S., can always out-innovate others is appropriately challenged. Puglisi hits the target regarding the West’s error in thinking China would embrace globalism and capitalism. She also rightfully notes that China views itself as engaged in a strategic rivalry with the U.S. and uses a “whole-of-society” approach to target the foundation of U.S. power. Its methodology successfully exploits the West’s beliefs that China will come around, while at the same time using a carrot-and-stick approach for allowing Western businesses access to China’s markets. Puglisi emphasizes that China only abides by the rules when called to account — and then only for as long as needed before ignoring them again.
Chapter 6 turns toward China’s efforts to target defense technology. James Mulvenon and Chenny Zhang look into how such acquisitions complement Beijing’s overall strategy. They make it clear that much of China’s progress on military platforms and systems is related to technology theft. China’s old model of “steal, reverse engineer and reproduce” has been replaced by the new model of “cooperate, learn, master and re-innovate.”
Chapter 7 starts a deeper dive into Beijing’s worldwide efforts with co-editors Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup and Ryan Fedasiuk painting a vivid picture of China’s efforts in Europe. Beijing recognizes the European Union as one of the most innovative regions in the world and uses all organs of state power to acquire its technology. Of note are the Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, especially in Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the CCP’s reminders that students must repay the homeland. There is also a network of Chinese professional associations and guilds, half of which openly state that they are engaged in transferring technology.
Elsa Kania and Peter Wood cover the People’s Liberation Army’s acquisition of foreign technology in Chapter 13. They aptly point out that what is often missed in the seemingly innocent acquisition of commercial technology is its dual use for defense applications. More important is the transfer of design and manufacturing techniques that also have military purposes. Simply having the technology does not equate with understanding how to reproduce it. Once again, the authors point to the practice of sending students abroad to study and research developments in critical-needs areas.
In Chapter 14, “Foreign Technology and the Surveillance State,” Dahlia Peterson writes about how China has used its acquisitions to build what is likely the most intrusive state monitoring of a country’s citizens in modern history. The concerns are made greater by China’s application of Western-acquired AI and chip technology to increase its surveillance capabilities.
Alex Joske and Stoff’s contribution in Chapter 15 is worthy of a book of its own. They explain how China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) contributes to the composite strategy. Made up of party and state agencies, the UFWD conducts a dragnet for talent. Ethnic minorities, religious groups, business leaders and the wider Chinese diaspora are targeted. The essential takeaway: UFWD has a presence in most developed countries with the purpose of supporting technology acquisition.
The remaining two chapters cover a more difficult topic. In Chapter 17, another contribution from Puglisi, “Chinese Students, Scholarship, and U.S. Innovation,” confronts the difficulties of welcoming students while not opening the door to creating research and technology theft opportunities. In Chapter 18, Mulvenon, Tatlow and Joske look at Western mitigation efforts. While there has been some success in tightening the flow of technology, the book makes clear there is much more to do.
This is a highly recommended anthology. Each chapter is extensively footnoted and of clear academic quality, yet is easy to read. Perhaps the real takeaway is that Western democracy, individual freedoms and relaxed state control represent a perfect system for exploitation. It raises the question: Is it time for the West to develop a “composite innovation system” designed to restrict its technology from being used against it?
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