How Visegrád Group countries approach Russian energy ties
By Paolo Zucconi, research associate, Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe
Russia, with its vast reserves of natural resources, has played a crucial role in Europe’s energy security for decades, and even more so for the former Warsaw Pact countries whose energy infrastructure had been linked to the Soviet Union. That includes the countries of the Visegrád Group — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia — though today’s energy relations between Russia and each of these countries vary in perspective and approach. For instance, while Slovakia emphasizes the historical ties and economic benefits of cooperation with Russia in energy matters, Poland expresses concern about dependence and geopolitical risk. Therefore, despite a significant decline in energy cooperation between European Union countries and Russia — following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — some countries in East Central Europe, including Hungary and Slovakia, continue to import Russian gas. The Czech Republic and Poland, however, do not, highlighting a deep division within the Visegrád Group.
Even during their integration into NATO (1999-2004) and the EU (2004), the Visegrád countries continued to depend on Russian gas, oil and nuclear technology, which at that time was considered an opportunity to import cheap energy rather than a geopolitical threat. From 2005 to 2020, political movements with populist and authoritarian tendencies arose in the region. Some of these factions also displayed pro-Russian inclinations. Notably, parties such as Direction-Social Democracy (SocialNet Demokracia or SMER-SD) in Slovakia and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége or FIDESZ) in Hungary exhibited sympathies toward Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, and energy cooperation with Russia increased during that time.
The electoral successes of SMER-SD in Slovakia in 2006 and FIDESZ in Hungary in 2010 prompted significant shifts in those countries’ foreign policies and reassessments of relations with Russia. Hungary’s increasing isolation within NATO and the EU, particularly evident after 2015, led to closer cooperation with Russia as a means to avoid isolation in Europe. But Hungary’s alignment with Putin and Russia continued, even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
In Slovakia, SMER-SD governments demonstrated similar tendencies in their relations with Russia. However, Slovakia’s political landscape — characterized by instability — tempered the dominance of any single party. SMER-SD’s loss of power in 2020 led to a reduction in Russophile sentiment within the government. Therefore, Slovakia’s alignment with the EU and NATO, particularly in supporting Ukraine, can be contrasted with Hungary’s position on the war.
Czech attitudes toward Russia are more complex. Between 1993 and 2022, their perceptions of Russia were dominated by pragmatism, and mostly based on economic cooperation and energy affairs. This perspective can be observed in the attitudes of political leaders such as Václav Klaus and Miloš Zeman. Furthermore, the rise of the ANO 2011 party in 2011, whose leader Andrej Babiš openly called Russia an important economic partner, reflects this stance.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reshaped ties between the EU and Moscow, prompting widespread condemnation and the imposition of significant economic sanctions. While EU members such as the Baltic states and Poland led efforts to counter Russian aggression, others, such as Hungary and Slovakia, were hesitant to modify their relationships.
Dependence on Russian energy, particularly oil and gas, persists in Hungary and Slovakia despite declarations of intent by the Slovak government in 2022 to diversify energy imports. Although EU sanctions targeted various sectors of the Russian economy, sanctions against the energy industry remain contentious, partly due to opposition from Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia and the influence of pro-Russian and opportunistic political leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico.
The Hungarian government’s reluctance to support Ukraine and resistance to energy sanctions strained relations not only with Western countries but also with neighboring partners such as Poland and led to tensions within the Visegrád Group. The complexities of energy cooperation between Hungary and Russia underscore broader geopolitical implications for East Central Europe.
Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations Research Institute, noted in 2023 that Russia’s conflict with Ukraine has revealed the fragmentation of the EU. This division is evident in the varying responses of EU governments and their perceptions of the Russian threat, including defense budgets, armament and ammunition supplies for Ukraine, and energy.
Hungary and Slovakia — Europe’s new black sheep?
Since 1991, Hungarian foreign policy has consistently viewed Russia as an economic partner rather than an adversary. From 1991 to 2004, economic collaboration with Russia was deemed integral to national foreign policy objectives, albeit secondary to aspirations for NATO and Western integration. However, from 2004 to 2010, Russia emerged as a crucial energy supplier and a potential major trading partner.
A pivotal shift occurred with FIDESZ’s election victory in 2010. This shift, as highlighted by Jan Zielonka and Jacques Rupnik in 2020, juxtaposed the rejection of an open society and EU interventions with a staunch defense of sovereignty that embraces an organic concept of the nation rooted in cultural and historic heritage. Consequently, Hungary found itself increasingly isolated within the EU and NATO, necessitating Eastern counterbalances, with Putin’s Russia assuming elevated importance. In March 2007, FIDESZ leader Orbán, then in the opposition, denounced Russia’s use of energy as a political weapon. But by 2009 — as the presumptive winner of the upcoming spring 2010 elections — he engaged in a seemingly impromptu meeting with Putin in St. Petersburg, documented online at the time by the blog Hungarian Spectrum, that seems much more important in hindsight.
Amid FIDESZ’s expanding power and Orbán’s intensified rapport with Russia, the Paks II Nuclear Power Plant agreement, signed in January 2014, emerged as a defining moment. However, divergent interpretations abound regarding the agreement’s true nature, with critics labeling it as a conduit for Russian influence in the guise of economic collaboration. Zoltán Illés, a former FIDESZ legislator and state secretary for the environment until 2014, characterized the Paks deal as “camouflage” for a Russian financial transaction aimed at securing influence with Hungary’s government. He suggested the deal focused more on injecting funds into Hungary’s economy — particularly during Orbán’s reelection bid in 2018 — than providing electricity. As of March 2024, only site preparation had taken place, although Alexey Likhachev, CEO of Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom, and Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó claim the progress on construction is moving quickly. Despite lingering doubts, Hungary’s alignment with Russia persisted, influencing its stance on geopolitical issues, including Ukraine. In May 2024, Czech President Petr Pavel pointed out that Hungary will remain dependent on Russia at least until the two new Paks II reactors are completed.
Since 2014, Hungary has increasingly bolstered ties with Russia, driven by divergent interests vis-à-vis the EU and NATO. Orbán’s vocal opposition to EU sanctions and reluctance to support Ukraine underscored Hungary’s growing estrangement from its Western allies. Moreover, Budapest’s contentious maneuvers, blocking Ukraine’s EU integration in addition to opposing EU sanctions against Russia, further solidified its alignment with Moscow. However, these efforts yielded little success, highlighting the inherent asymmetry in the relationship.
Despite the outbreak of war and subsequent tensions, the Hungarian government’s stance toward its Russian counterpart has remained largely unchanged. While Western leaders have refrained from engaging with Russia directly, Szijjártó participated in several high-level meetings, including attending the Energy Expo in Sochi, Russia, and meeting with Likhachev in Uzbekistan.
Despite the significant geopolitical shifts resulting from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Hungary and Slovakia experienced minimal changes to their energy supply dynamics. The victory of SMER-SD and its leader Fico in Slovakia’s September 2023 elections signaled a resurgence of Russophile sentiments that were temporarily concealed in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify energy sources faced challenges. Slovakia pursued liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreements with several countries but struggled to find viable alternatives to Russian gas. Despite intentions to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, progress has remained sluggish, hindered by political opposition and infrastructure limitations.
Within the context of EU-Russia relations, the debate over sanctions and energy security intensified. While all EU members, including Hungary and Slovakia, agreed on sanctions, implementing effective measures proved difficult. The Hungarian government opposed sanctions that threatened its energy supply from Russia, citing the need to safeguard national interests. At the same time, Orbán emphasized Hungary’s commitment to green energy in his latest State of the Nation address in March 2024, highlighting plans for a rapid expansion in solar power and the construction of the two new reactors at Paks II NPP. He positioned Hungary as a leader in this transition, stressing the importance of efficient energy storage solutions and significant government investment in this area. Orbán portrayed the shift to green energy as vital for both environmental sustainability and economic growth.
Hungary’s steadfast commitment to maintaining energy cooperation with Russia can be defined as opportunistic and diverges from broader EU strategies aimed at reducing dependence on Russian imports. Despite criticism and calls for sanctions, Hungary remains entrenched in its energy partnership with Russia, citing economic stability and national security concerns.
Nuclear energy presents unique challenges amid the geopolitical turmoil. Rosatom continues nuclear exports to Europe, with Hungary notably increasing nuclear fuel imports. Efforts to diversify supply have faced obstacles, including technical complexities and contractual obligations, prolonging dependence on Russian nuclear technology.
Hungary’s energy policies underscore its distinct position within the EU, prioritizing stability and self-interest amid geopolitical uncertainties. Despite EU sanctions and calls for diversification, Hungary is maintaining a delicate balance between regional alliances and national imperatives. Hungary’s April 2024 gas deal with Turkey, to import about 4.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year via Turkish pipelines, shows Hungary intends to maintain this direction.
Since February 2022, Slovakia has been seeking alternative sources of oil and gas, driven in part by industry demands for renewable energy sector reforms. Despite these calls for change and the government’s intention to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, progress has been slow.
Slovakia boasts robust gas connections with neighboring countries, thanks to a diversification program initiated by the European Commission in 2013. In her contribution to an article for the German think tank Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2023, Veronika Oravcová, of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, highlights Slovakia’s achievement in establishing reverse gas-flow capabilities and completing new interconnectors with all neighboring countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. These efforts have facilitated access to the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, Poland, with the first tender launched in mid-November 2022. However, discussions on revitalizing dormant projects or expanding existing ones face opposition from political parties, such as SMER-SD, and local communities. This is particularly true regarding the construction of infrastructure such as wind-power projects. Consequently, despite the intention to diversify energy sources, the actual implementation of projects and reforms is complex, further complicated by the victory of SMER-SD in the latest national elections.
The Czech Republic’s differing perspectives
Russia, with its history, economy, power and culture, has long been a controversial and influential force within Czech society. According to Jan Holzer, a political scientist and professor at Masaryk University, for two centuries, Czechs have “tended to project into Russia their visions, dreams, and illusions, which in their majority stemmed from dissatisfaction with the imperfect political realities of their own societies.” This complex relationship has been marked by alternating periods of cooperation and tension, reflecting broader shifts in international dynamics and domestic political landscapes.
In the early 2000s, the Czech government focused on increasing exports to Russia to reduce its trade deficit, which was due largely to significant energy imports. Energy cooperation became a key element of economic relations between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. This relationship is a legacy of the Cold War — particularly a 1955 agreement on nuclear energy between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia — and has resulted in an uninterrupted energy supply. Following the Cold War and until the Nord Stream pipeline became operational in 2011, the Czech Republic served as a crucial transit country for Russian gas heading to Western Europe, including Germany.
In 2003, the Templin Nuclear Power Plant, equipped with Russian-designed VVER-1000 reactors, began operations and became the largest source of electrical power in the country. The Czech Republic has traditionally been a net exporter of electricity due to its domestic coal resources and nuclear power generation. Although it began diversifying its energy supply in the 1990s, by 2014 the Czech Republic still imported about 60% of its gas and oil from Russia — but it remains less dependent than neighboring Slovakia.
Before the late 1990s, the gas transit corridor through Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Austria was the sole export route for Russian natural gas to Europe. The Yamal pipeline through Poland, which began operations in 1999, began a shift to new export routes, a trend that continued with implementation of the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea in 2011-2012, connecting to the Czech gas transmission system via the OPAL pipeline in Germany.
By 2015, the Czech Republic’s natural gas imports came primarily from two sources: Russia’s Gazprom and a consortium of Norwegian companies. This situation has remained relatively unchanged, although the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, one of Europe’s most controversial energy infrastructure projects, placed the Czech Republic in a complex position between its sponsors (German-Russian business ventures) and opponents, such as the Polish and Slovak governments.
In terms of nuclear power technology, the Czech Republic has been dependent on Russia for many decades. In 2018, then-U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry warned the Czech government against partnering with Russia for its national nuclear energy plan, emphasizing that Russia uses energy as a political weapon and advocating for United States nuclear suppliers as a safer, more reliable option. Perry’s visit to Prague was part of efforts by the first administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to persuade East Central European countries to import natural gas from the U.S. and other suppliers instead of Russia. As of 2018, Russia was the main gas supplier for many countries in Europe, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, with these countries each receiving 75% to 100% of their natural gas imports from Russia.
Furthermore, until the general elections of 2021, when then-Prime Minister Babiš lost the premiership, the Czech government was hesitant to phase out fossil fuels, particularly coal, which significantly contribute to climate change. The EU’s Green Deal, aimed at initiating a transition from fossil fuel to carbon-free energy sources, poses challenges for the Czech Republic, a landlocked and mountainous country. At the COP 26 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, United Kingdom, in November 2021, Babiš strongly criticized the Green Deal and the European Commission’s proposals, arguing they could have devastating social, economic, political and geopolitical impacts on Europe, potentially leading to societal tensions, empowering radicals and threatening democracy.
February 2022 and the onset of war in Ukraine found the Czech energy sector dealing with significant challenges, primarily a heavy reliance on imports of energy commodities — crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas — from Russia. For decades, this dependency created significant risks of supply shortages or shutdowns, with potentially severe consequences for the Czech economy. Although nuclear fuel was also a concern, it was not as critical due to existing stocks at both of the country’s nuclear power plants. Changes in legislation, development of renewable energy sources and maintaining a sufficient fuel base for electricity and heat production created additional challenges. Finally, there were policy shifts sparked by EU decarbonization targets — investment in energy-saving measures, development of small photovoltaic (PV) systems, etc. — and changing foreign policy priorities after Babiš’s premiership (2017-2021) and Zeman’s presidency (2013-2023) ended.
Despite the Czech presidency’s limited powers, Zeman’s influence on foreign policy was significant, and he often used it to promote a positive image of Russia. In a March 2016 interview with China Global Television Network, Zeman described Czech foreign policy as being based on “our own national interest” rather than succumbing to “pressure from the United States and the European Union.” While previous presidents such as Václav Havel recognized Russia as a potential source of instability, Zeman often viewed Russia as an opportunity for renewed economic relations and a counterbalance to the West.
Zeman’s support for Putin’s Russia makes him a polarizing figure. In 2014, on the 25th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution — the peaceful end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, which also led to an amicable split of the country into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 — thousands protested, waving red cards and throwing eggs, one of which hit visiting German President Joachim Gauck. Protests against Zeman continued until 2021, with demonstrators calling for his resignation. And in April 2021, when Czech authorities concluded that the Russian military intelligence service GRU was responsible for an ammunition warehouse explosion in Vrbětice in 2014, Zeman controversially countered the military’s conclusions. Pavel Fischer, chairman of the Czech Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, said at the time: “With his manipulative statements, Zeman already stands on Russia’s side and has become its advocate.”
With the crisis caused by the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, the Czech government and the entire energy sector have been compelled to respond swiftly. In addition to addressing sharp increases in electricity and gas prices, the government has managed to cut imports of Russian gas by about 90%. Cooperation in the nuclear energy sector was already downgraded in 2021 when the Czech Republic canceled an agreement with Rosatom to build a new unit of the Dukovany Nuclear Power Station in response to Russia’s involvement in the Vrbětice incident. Nevertheless, dependency on Russian crude oil will persist until at least 2025.
The Polish exception
Poland’s historical relationship with Russia has been tumultuous, marked by centuries of conflict, wars and occupations. From the partition of Poland in the late 18th century by the Russian Empire to Soviet control during World War II (September 1939-June 1941) and much longer during the Cold War era, Poland has faced repeated attempts by Russia to exert dominance. These historical events have fostered deep-seated mistrust and animosity between the two countries, influencing their contemporary relations, including in the energy trade.
Together with the Baltic states, Poland has been the most critical of Russian aggression in Ukraine, dating to Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas. These geopolitical tensions have strained bilateral relations and contributed to Poland’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy imports. Additionally, Poland’s alignment with Western allies, particularly NATO, has shaped its energy policies to align with broader European security interests.
Poland’s reliance on Russian energy sources, particularly natural gas and oil, stems from geographical proximity and historical ties. Russia has been a major supplier of natural gas to Poland, with Gazprom supplying gas through pipelines like Yamal-Europe and Brotherhood. This dependence has raised concerns about energy security, given Russia’s history of using energy as a political weapon, conspicuous from past disputes and supply disruptions. Poland’s vulnerability to supply disruptions became evident during gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, which affected transit supplies to Poland. For example, in 2006 and 2009, Gazprom halted gas deliveries to Poland due to pricing disputes concerning Ukrainian transit pipelines, leading to shortages and economic disruptions. These incidents underscored the need for Poland to diversify its energy sources and reduce reliance on Russia.
As an EU member state, Poland’s energy policies are influenced by EU regulations and initiatives aimed at promoting energy security, sustainability and competitiveness. Poland’s efforts to diversify its energy mix align with the EU’s Energy Union strategy, which seeks to strengthen energy resilience and reduce reliance on single suppliers. Poland has participated in EU-funded projects to develop cross-border energy infrastructure and promote renewable energy sources, contributing to broader European energy security goals. One key initiative is the construction of the Świnoujście LNG terminal, which lets Poland import LNG from global markets. Moreover, Poland has invested in interconnection projects with neighboring countries, such as the Baltic Pipe project with Denmark and Norway, to enhance regional energy cooperation and diversify supply sources.
For Poland, the war in Ukraine represents a major change in energy relations with Russia. As Magdalena Maj reported in 2023 for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Russian gas made up about 87% of all gas imported into Poland in 2021, including shipments to Germany via the Yamal pipeline. However, a year later, the quantity had dropped dramatically to 20%, and by the first quarter of 2023, Poland ceased importing Russian gas entirely. During this period, LNG and the Baltic Pipe were responsible for 85% of Poland’s gas imports.
War and green targets: a complex intersection
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine served as a wake-up call for Europe, highlighting its heavy reliance on Russian gas and oil. Despite the urgency, some European governments had failed to sufficiently diversify their energy sources before the conflict. This was partly due to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of trying to economically integrate Russia into Europe. Consequently, Russia had the leverage to reduce or halt gas flow to certain countries, such as Poland, on multiple occasions over the past two decades.
At the EU level, delays in diversifying energy supply were influenced by divergent national foreign policy interests and varying perceptions of Russia among member states. While larger countries such as Germany and Poland managed to transition to more expensive alternatives after February 2022, smaller nations such as Hungary and Slovakia found themselves without appealing options. And while most EU governments sought new suppliers, Hungary’s Orbán openly supported increased imports of Russian gas.
The escalation of the war prompted many EU countries, such as Germany, to abandon friendly policies toward Russia. Whereas Polish attitudes toward Russia remain negative to the extent that two-thirds of Poles want to increase sanctions on Russia, Hungary and Slovakia find themselves in a difficult position and remain reluctant to follow suit. This is compounded by Germany’s decision to shut down its nuclear energy industry and push for sanctions on Russian nuclear fuel, affecting Hungary’s plans for the Paks II NPP project.
Energy has long been central to Hungarian-Russian relations, with Orbán’s government showing no inclination to change course. Gas imports play a crucial role in Hungary’s relations with Russia. The Paks II NPP project symbolizes the close ties between Budapest and Moscow, although its implementation relies on technology and permissions from other countries such as France and Germany.
Hungary’s multilevel ties with Russia distinguish it from neighboring countries, shaping its foreign policy differently. While similarities existed between Hungary’s and Poland’s domestic policy shifts, their foreign policies diverge. Not all foreign policy decisions align with energy and security policies, as demonstrated by Slovakia’s gas diversification challenges and the omission of the nuclear industry from sanctions packages.
While the war in Ukraine has brought energy security to the top of the EU agenda, it has also highlighted the vulnerabilities of many countries in East Central Europe that used to rely on imports from Russia. The convergence between dependency on Russian energy and green targets, as defined in the EU Green Deal, represents a particular challenge for the economies of the Visegrád Group. This includes the Czech Republic and Poland, which managed to cut imports from Russia but remain highly fossil fuel-oriented, and some regions rely on coal mining for employment.
According to Tobias Riepl and Zuzana Zavarská of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, the EU Green Deal, which is intended to guide the EU toward carbon emission neutrality, has faced skepticism in the Visegrád countries. Data from REN21 and World Energy Statistics show that Hungary has seen a decline in its renewable energy share, currently at about 12%. In the Czech Republic, the renewable energy share of the electricity mix has been relatively stagnant, at 14% in 2024, with most of that coming from biomass and hydropower. Poland has been making efforts to increase its renewable energy capacity, particularly in wind power, and renewables have reached about 17% of its electricity production. Slovakia has seen a moderate increase in renewable energy, to about 22%, with a significant portion of its renewable electricity coming from hydropower.
Conclusion
The complexities of energy relations within the Visegrád Group — particularly regarding the factors of long-term dependency on Russia and the EU’s green targets — underscore both the challenges and the divergent approaches among the four states. While historical ties and economic considerations have shaped energy cooperation with Russia, recent geopolitical events have prompted shifts in attitudes and policies.
Countries such as Hungary and Slovakia have maintained significant reliance on Russian energy, despite calls for diversification and EU sanctions targeting many sectors. This reliance has not only strained relations within the Visegrád Group but also raised concerns about energy security and geopolitical vulnerabilities. Poland, however, has taken proactive measures to reduce dependence on Russian imports, investing in LNG terminals and interconnection projects to enhance energy resilience.
The intersection of energy dependency and green targets presents a unique challenge for the region, highlighting the need for balanced strategies that prioritize both sustainability and security. While progress has been made in improving energy efficiency and increasing renewable energy capacity, obstacles remain, including dependence on fossil fuels and concerns about social implications. In some Central and Eastern European countries it also includes lower starting points that created path dependencies, limited (although growing) social recognition of the climate crisis, and concerns about social fallout due to employment in the coal and automotive sectors.
As the Visegrád countries navigate these challenges, cooperation within the EU and concerted efforts to diversify energy sources will be essential for enhancing resilience and achieving climate neutrality.
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